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Abstract
 
As we know from history, in court cases experts used to be called in when 
the defendant showed symptoms of a psychiatric illness. This was necessary, 
as the law itself did not provide rules about how to define abnormality. 
Mental illness needed an explanation for it to fit into the framework of the 
criminal justice system. With the emancipation of the empirical psychology 
and progress in the examination of patients’ brains with modern imaging 
techniques, a separation has developed between the naturalistic man-oriented 
view of offending, and empiricism, in which facts are true if they are 
measured with reproducible tests. This is the case with judicial rulings about 
responsibility for a crime, the presence of illness at the time of the offence 
and the risk of recidivism concerning the length of treatment of mentally ill 
offenders and their targets. These aspects in the debate between the court and 
expert witnesses are discussed separately. The conclusion is that the field of 
law has been extended into the field of empirical sciences for more 
objectivity, and that the influence of these sciences on juridical reality can 
play an auxiliary role only. It is therefore necessary that judges and lawyers 
be trained in the use of empirical data. Still, forensic reality requires an 
interpretation, in which the forensic psychiatrist has different loyalties to the 
relevant parties in the court proceedings. But he is above all a medical man 
with ethical restrictions. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Courts of law have always asked for the assistance of non-juridical experts. 
The presence of a medical expert, however, was not always accepted and in 
some cases laymen or clergymen were asked to give their opinion on the 
suspect’s mental condition. In cases with a strong emphasis on the mental 
state of the suspect, it wasn’t until the sixteenth century that doctors were 
asked to advise the court.1 
In the middle of the nineteenth century, neurology, the science of the 
mind at that time, had grown to be a medical specialisation. Law and 
medicine had both become professions requiring academic training. From 
that time on, courts turned to medical specialists for expert opinion, as they 
were the self-proclaimed experts in the field of those mental disturbances 
that led to antisocial behaviour and crime. Research in neurology then was 
empirical and used the possibilities of its time: a fully somatic origin of brain 
diseases was suspected, while neuroanatomy took place mainly by visual 
inspection or under a microscope. Emil Kraepelin (1856-1926) was the 
pioneer of neuro-psychiatric nosology (the taxonomy of diseases) at the end 
of the century. Before him, Wilhelm Griesinger (1817 – 1868) had already 
said that all mental diseases were diseases of the brain. 
What claims can psychiatry make nowadays regarding its field of 
knowledge? With its origins in medicine, it has an empirical side, on which 
much emphasis is put. Technology has made it possible to use fMRI 
(functional magnetic resonance imaging) to make images of the brain when 
it is having symptoms like hallucinations or performing certain tasks. 
Genetics is making remarkable progress in showing the function or 
dysfunction of certain genes, with all the various consequences for the 
metabolism of nerve cells. Much more understanding has been reached with 
regard to the chemical substances in the brain called neurotransmitters. Not 
only have more specific anti-psychotic and anti-depressant drugs been 
developed, but the complexity of the brain has also been demonstrated by 
working with functional neural circuits connected by these neurotransmitters 
in bio-physiological research. 
Psychiatry, however, although its origins lie in everyday practice and 
patient care, also has a psychological and philosophical side. It is concerned 
with the patient as a human being, with his or her individual vulnerability 
and dependence on rewarding relationships, the social context of disease, 
like living in a dangerous neighbourhood and the presence of alcohol and 
drugs, and man’s limited ability to make choices, such as the cooperation 
with a treatment for his illness or the willingness to resume his work after an 
illness which has not totally disappeared. Psychiatry, like all practices in 
                                                 
1 M. Prosono, ‘History of forensic psychiatry’ in R. Rosner (ed.), Principles & 
Practice of Forensic Psychiatry (London: Hodder Education 2003, 2nd ed.) 14 at 30. 
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medicine, is both the art of maintaining a good relationship with one’s 
patients and creating a supportive network around him, and the science of 
using the right techniques and treatments for a certain disease, as has been 
worked out in ‘evidence based medicine’.2  
 
2 Forensic framework 
 
In forensic psychiatry, when a doctor wants to treat mentally disordered 
offenders, he applies the same skills and medical ethics as used in regular 
psychiatry. But there is more: the context, which is no longer merely social, 
but juridical – another domain of rules and science. It has been reduced to 
special laws, for example mental health laws and criminal law, which means 
that others than the psychiatrist have their special expertise. The psychiatrist 
not only works within his own field of knowledge and the rules reigning in 
it, but is also restricted by rules from another field of knowledge in his 
primary concern: the relationship with his patient. So forensic psychiatry 
works within a three-partite model, which should be integrative: the legal-
empirical-forensic model.3 This model has a legal background and uses 
juridical definitions, taken from law books, and jurisprudence, taken from 
court cases. To operate in this domain in court, the expert witness is required 
to have the necessary knowledge and experience.  
The second, the empirical part of the model concerns the application 
and analysis of the juridical criteria in the psychiatric or psychological 
examination of the patient. A check should follow of the findings of the 
examination, by comparing them with the observations already made and the 
interpretations thereof. Preferably, the methods of the examination will be 
strictly empirically based, which means that for measurements validated 
methods from an independent theory or model are used as much as possible. 
These can be structured checklists for the main topics on which the 
arguments in the model are based, like drug use, changes in the level of 
consciousness and amnesia. The third, the forensic aspect concerns the 
specific characteristics of the examinee, patient and/or suspect, and the 
situation and circumstances of the offence, brought together in a hypothesis 
and its possible affirmation by the found facts. The forensic view implies the 
conclusion that the examinee does or does not fit the juridical context 
brought forward by the questions of the court on certain forensic psychiatric 
criteria founded on the real examination. 
                                                 
2 H.J.C. van Marle, Tussen wet en wetmatigheid. De forensische psychiatrie in 
sociaal perspectief, Inaugural lecture (Deventer: Kluwer 2004). 
3 R. Rogers and D.W. Shuman, Fundaments of Forensic Practice; Mental Health 
and Criminal Law (New York: Springer 2005). 
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With this legal-empirical-forensic model and within its domain of 
‘reasonable medical certainty’, psychiatry has the following contribution to 
make to the domain of law: a diagnosis with a specific context as criterion 
for conclusions about the possible relationship, such as offence (criminal 
law), competence (health law), capacity to work (insurance), and damages 
(liability in law). This diagnosis – not to be confused with a category in a 
diagnostic classification, such as the DSM-IV – leads to conclusions about 
responsibility, fitness to stand trial, competence for decision making, 
compensation for being not able to work and compensation for damage 
done. Medical knowledge then can assess ‘with medical certainty’ the 
development of a certain disorder and predict possible problems or risks 
which are the consequences of this disorder. With that, essential clues in 
behaviour can also be assessed and after that managed by a specific 
psychiatric treatment. Because of their experience in this field, forensic 
psychiatrists are often asked to participate in the drafting of new laws on the 
above-mentioned subjects. 
The definition, then, of forensic psychiatry is the application of 
psychiatric examination, diagnosis and treatment within the realm of law, 
according to those criteria which need to be explained to legal experts before 
they are able to apply the rules of law, such as jurisprudence or risk for 
recidivism (dangerousness). There is an interface with the law, which means 
that forensic psychiatry and the law have something in common, concepts 
used in law, defined by law but to be filled in by forensic psychiatry. So 
forensic psychiatry has to know these definitions and their usage, and it has 
to translate them into psychiatric concepts which are suited for further 
psychiatric examination. Research within a forensic psychiatric population 
does not mean that this is forensic research. A forensic examination and 
research bear in mind certain juridical criteria, like risk, recidivism, 
responsibility and violent behaviour. In this view, forensic psychotherapy 
means that forensic patients with a juridical background and aim, which is to 
control the psychiatric disorder so that re-offending is prevented. From now 
on I will use the term forensic psychiatry in relation to criminal law, because 
in criminal law offences and the use of the criterion of responsibility are 
well-defined, in contrast to damage and liability law. Still, the analogy 
remains with forensic psychiatric activities in other domains of the law. 
 
 
3 Theoretical model 
 
This legal-empirical-forensic model needs a theory, a view on human 
behaviour, as it examines the interactions between a persons biological 
aspects like the functioning of his brain circuits, his psychological states and 
traits and the social context he lives in. A comprehensive model to combine 
these different levels of human functioning is the bio-psycho-social model of 
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Engel4 in which, depending on the latest development in psychiatry, the 
emphasis of the research can switch between these interdependent fields. It 
is questionable, however, if this often-mentioned model does indeed 
integrate the thinking and practice of these three levels, or that the word 
‘model’ is used only to serve as window-dressing for pursuing efforts in one 
domain instead of all three together. With the modern demands for evidence-
based medicine, research nowadays is on an empirical basis, and so is 
mainly epidemiological, psycho-biological and psychological assessment. 
The preferred tool for scientific empirical research is the randomised 
controlled trial (RCT), which, because it uses a control group, is different 
from the individual-based forensic psychiatric examination. A scientific 
comparison with a control person is not possible, as the examination with or 
without auxiliary empirical examinations, such as fMRI, tries to find an 
answer particular to one case only, within the context of that specific 
situation. That is why judges and psychiatrists feel comfortable with each 
other: They both focus on a specific and unique individual. 
For the court, the purpose of the forensic psychiatric assessment is to 
inform the judges about the person and personality of the suspect with regard 
to the offence he has been charged with.5 As each case is different in its 
psychiatric diagnosis, criminal context and the manner in which the offence 
was committed, different scientific models can be applied to a case. 
Depending on the background of the forensic psychiatrist and the 
clarification which has been sought to make the case understandable and 
open to judgement by others, he can choose a model with the best fit. Like 
regular psychiatry, forensic psychiatry is a multidisciplinary specialisation, 
based on its broad bio-psycho-social model. These models for investigation, 
explanation and conclusions should be based on available scientific 
knowledge and the ‘state of the art’ of the forensic psychiatric field.  
In the United States, agreed-upon criteria are used to judge the 
scientific level of the forensic report, the so-called Daubert criteria (from the 
1993 court case Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc.) for scientific 
evidence. These are: 
1. Falsifiability should be shown by the fact whether it can be and has 
been tested. 
2. The theory or technique has been subjected to peer-review and 
publication. 
                                                 
4 G.L. Engel, ‘The clinical application of the biopsychosocial model’ (1980) 137 
American Journal of Psychiatry 534 at 544. 
5 H.J.C. van Marle, ‘Het strafrechtelijk psychiatrisch gedragskundigenonderzoek’ in 
B.C.M. Raes and F.A.M. Bakker (eds.), De psychiatrie in het Nederlands recht 
(Deventer: Kluwer 2007, 5th ed.) 113 at 136. 
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3. The known or potential rate of error of the technique and procedures 
can be established. 
4. The theory or technique has general acceptance in the relevant 
scientific community. 
Especially in the dialogue between courts and psychiatrists, tests with a 
numerical conclusion seem important, but behind such a clear answer lies 
the validity of these tests and the reliability and experience of the expert with 
these tests. Also, there are no rules whether or not to use tests in forensic 
psychiatry, only on a scientific level. But these tests, with the exclusion of 
risk-assessment scales for recidivism, are not able to give an answer to 
juridical questions like responsibility or competence, as these concepts are 
juridical and philosophical by nature. Conclusions from tests and other 
empirical measurements like medical diagnostics are far from exact, 
considering their internal correlations and certainty of their prediction. Until 
now, a chance of more than 80 per cent never has been demonstrated. Nor 
can the rate of error in psychiatric technique be shown, as it is a verbal 
medical examination, reproducible only by the same or another psychiatrist 
in the same way and with the same patient. For forensic psychiatry, the 
hallmarks of expertise are peer-review, publication and general acceptance 
in the relevant scientific community. 
There is not just one expert: forensic expertise can only be tested by 
the court by asking another psychiatrist or psychologist for a second opinion. 
In criminal court sessions with a great impact on the life of the suspect 
(prison sentence or detained under a hospital order) the expert should be 
interrogated by the court and not be a decision-making member of it. 
Psychiatry, and therefore forensic psychiatry, working from their bio-
psycho-social framework, will not succeed in meeting these Daubert criteria 
fully; certainly not in Europe, where due to the philosophical background the 
emphasis is more on ‘man as a whole’. So next to giving responsibility for 
the quality of the scientific level of the conclusions in the report itself, each 
case assessment has to be acknowledged by expert colleagues (the peers) in 
the form of guidelines by the responsible professional organisations about 
the quality of the report.6 These guidelines prescribe the contents, the 
required validity of the connections between subjective accounts, objective 
symptomatology, decrease of mental functioning; they also dictate the 
criteria for the court, such as responsibility for the offence, fitness to stand 
trial, the mental capacity for decision making, and the ability to resume work 
and further social functioning. They also include warnings on unverifiable 
data, like unconscious motives, or unwarranted conclusions, drawn for 
example from childhood. The guidelines reflect the current state of (forensic) 
                                                 
6 R. Weinstock, G.B. Leong and J.A. Silva, ‘Ethical Guidelines’, in R. Rosner (ed.), 
Principles & Practice of Forensic Psychiatry, above n. 1, 56 at 72. 
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psychiatry and are subject to regular renewal by special representative 
committees. 
Giving advice about the link between the mentally disordered 
offender and the crime he has committed is the essential activity and primary 
idea in forensic psychiatry, as this link justifies the presence of forensic 
psychiatrists in court in a certain case. Only once the connection between 
offence and disorder has been demonstrated (step 1) can the level of 
responsibility for this offence be assessed (step 2). As a third step, it is 
possible to advice about the treatment necessary in this case to reduce the 
risk of re-offending. There are three theoretical behavioural models to be 
used for forensic fact finding. Firstly, we have the ideographic model, in 
which psychiatric diagnostics and assessment of impairment in functioning 
are at the centre and are judged in their relationship to the offence. This is 
plain psychiatric diagnosis based on the story of the examinee and the 
actuarial reports. Secondly, there is the cognitive-behavioural model, with its 
contingencies and learned behaviour as a result of both psycho-biological 
factors and contextual reinforcement. It has been tested in empirical research 
for its efficacy in treatment and supported by laboratory models, and uses 
essential psychological reasoning. Finally: the phenomenological model 
comes to the fore, with its emphasis on understanding and clarification of the 
offence in terms of meaning and motives. It has the advantage of producing 
a carefully painted picture of the examinee, but the disadvantage is the 
irreproducible, highly personal nature of the ‘facts’, which are based on 
opinion rather than verification. An example of this kind of examination is 
the psychoanalytical one, which is for that reason not used anymore. But in 
its impressionistic way it resembles the stories told in court and with them a 
deepening of insight seems possible with regard to the question: How could 
this have happened? It is appealing, but not verifiable. 
 
4 Ethical demands 
 
It is then the psychiatrist who examines the suspect or the forensic patient 
within a double framework: as a doctor and as a forensic specialist. Should 
he identify with a ‘welfare paradigm’, whereby he upholds the altruistic and 
beneficent tenets of medicine ‘to do good for the patients’? Or should he be 
required to act within an opposite ‘justice paradigm’, in which he is expected 
to act and to uphold justice principles as applied in due legal process?7 In my 
opinion, the two paradigms do not exclude each other, as they are normal 
activities done by a psychiatrist from the essence of being a doctor. The 
                                                 
7 J.E. Arboleda-Florez,, ‘The ethics of forensic psychiatry’ (2006) 19 Current 
Opinion in Psychiatry 544 at 546. 
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Hippocratic oath, primum non nocere, primarily means: Do nothing that can 
harm your patient. It not only includes the use of different medical 
treatments (not harmless in early years and even still with regard to the 
treatment of cancer) but confidentiality as well. Medical confidentiality is 
based on the ethical rule that a patient has the right to visit a doctor without 
running the risk of his doctor breaching his confidentiality, so that the patient 
will no longer feel free to speak about his ailments. But from the year 1976 
the rulings of the Supreme Court of California in the Tarasoff case spread all 
over the world: the duty doctors and psychologists have to protect the 
physical and psychic integrity of a third subject against assaults made by 
their patients. One can also question to what extent a mentally disordered 
offender is harmed when the psychiatrist, using his knowledge of the 
treatment, warns his patient not to continue his threatening behaviour, or 
reports to the probation officer or the police in extreme cases with a high risk 
of a new offence. Of course, contacting a colleague before that time has its 
advantages, but with a highly explosive patient there is not much time. But 
even then, the forensic expert will protect his patient from another trial and 
verdict, and perhaps from remorse about another victim.  
So, in forensic psychotherapy and forensic assessment and 
examination, there are rules to this engagement, which are intended to lead 
to motivation for participation and informed consent. Informed consent is 
based upon sufficient information to make a choice and enough time to 
consider the alternatives which should also have been proposed by an 
impartial and trusted expert. In these rules, the different roles of the expert 
and doctor are described so as to reflect the different responsibilities and 
ethical stances. In my opinion, the forensic expert and the forensic therapist 
must be able to speak of their separate loyalties to their patient, explain 
them, and, with the patient’s consent, apply them if necessary. Complete 
confidentiality is no longer ethical in forensic psychiatry, as we have the 
knowledge (to a certain extent) to predict when harm will come to others, as 
former behaviour is the best predictor for future behaviour. Having this 
knowledge means we also bear responsibility for the community in which 
we live. General psychiatry also has to reckon with the possibility of 
criminal acts by a patient for the first time; these colleagues, too, should be 
trained to use the instruments of risk assessment, as they might know from 
their practice where risk factors lie hidden in the history or tales of their 
patients. 
But, to be explicit, a doctor remains a doctor, even when working for 
a third party, like a court. In his attitude towards the patient or examinee, he 
puts the well-being of his patient in first place by giving respect, whatever 
the circumstances, and by building up a relationship with a beginning, a 
middle and an end, after which the patient is left unharmed and informed. As 
such, the forensic physician can be seen as the patient’s counsellor, who 
mediates between him and society. Forensic assessment for the courts is a 
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translation of the patient’s status mentalis to the law, an explanation of the 
patient’s inner status when he committed the offence, viewed from his 
mental state at the moment of examination. The question of the 
responsibility then is a reconstruction, with all the distortions that makes 
possible. This, however, is not an empirical question, but a juridical one. 
Fact-finding and assessment take place in the juridical domain and the 
answer should also be sought within that domain. The purpose of this 
translation is to provide building bricks for the conclusion in the verdict. 
This participation by interpretation is the interface between psychiatry and 
the law, the law and psychiatry: participation is not possible without 
knowing each other’s rules and appreciating them. 
5 Assessment 
The relationship between the psychiatrist and the person undergoing 
assessment is different from that in a treatment situation. The difference 
needs to be made clear to persons being examined, in view of the fact that, 
based upon their previous experience with doctors, they will have the 
tendency to see no difference between the two and regard them as identical. 
Therefore, the meetings between the examiner and the examined should 
begin with information about the reason for and the nature of the 
examination, the questions put by the judge and the role of the examiner as 
independent expert. It should be made clear that the suspect does not have to 
cooperate with the examination.  
Contrary to the treatment situation, there is no question of secrecy on 
the part of the examiner. He is obliged to report all that he hears and this 
should be made clear to the suspect at the beginning so that he can take this 
into account. However, this lack of professional confidentiality does not 
mean that the examiner, psychiatrist or psychologist is not bound by his 
professional code; he must not exert unnecessary pressure on the suspect or 
cause psychiatric damage by a careless termination of the contact. The 
relationship between examiner and examinee should be partly for the benefit 
of the person being examined, who should, for example, be treated with 
respect and should benefit from the examination by gaining insight into his 
deeds. The examiner will have to actively guard against ending up in a 
pseudo-treatment relationship, in which the person being examined gives 
him confidential information that is not intended for use in the report. The 
methodical form and management of the relationship also play a role in the 
examining situation. Nevertheless, when the suspect makes confessions 
about crimes that he has not been charged with, then the examiner must 
immediately stop the examination and refer him to his lawyer. The examiner 
cannot carry out criminal investigations, which means that new questions 
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need to be put by the judge in order to include the new crimes in the 
behavioural examination. In addition, the knowledge of other, possibly more 
serious crimes make it impossible for the examiner to answer the original 
questions without involving, from a behavioural point of view, the new 
crimes, which are, after all, involved in the personality of the suspect.  
Finally, the person being examined needs to receive the assurance 
that the report will only be used by the court and by persons who are 
authorised to treat him in connection with the same crimes. There is no 
intention whatsoever to use this forensic psychiatric report outside the legal 
system, such as in custody disagreements and insurance questions, in view of 
the fact that the collection of the data and the means of argumentation are 
determined by the legal questions. Unfortunately, there are a number of 
cases in which judicial psychiatric reports have led a life of their own in 
other (legal) fields, to the disadvantage of the person examined. 
The court’s report is of particular importance because it enables the 
court and the public prosecutor as well as the lawyer to form an idea about 
the state of mind of the suspect at the time of the crime with which he is 
charged. An increasing number of psychiatrists and psychologists are 
involved in reports being drawn up nowadays. Although in the past usually 
done by a psychiatrist, the advent of the psychologist reporting to the court 
(together with or separate from the psychiatrist) has heralded the arrival of 
multidisciplinary reporting. Other academic experts, who have taken over 
the field of psychological debate and test-diagnostics as a separate 
department, can also take on the role of examiner and reporter. At the 
request of the examining judge, the psychiatrist often first issues a short 
report concerning the desirability of having a judicial psychiatric report. It is 
also possible for the district psychiatrist to inform the examining judge of the 
necessity of such a report without having been asked in advance. The 
examining judge may then issue an order for ambulant or clinical research. 
The questions put to the experts can vary in the way in which they are 
stated, but in principle will cover the following five questions: 
1. Does the suspect show any signs of inadequate development and/or 
pathological illness of his psychic capacities? 
2. If so, is there a relationship between this inadequate development 
and/or pathological illness and the crime of which he is accused? 
3. If so, what is the nature of the relationship and to what extent does it 
exist? 
4. To what degree can the suspect be said to be accountable for his 
actions? 
5. Do you have any advice concerning the choice of treatment that may 
prevent a repeat of the crime of which he is accused? 
The elaboration of these questions forms the evaluation of the accountability 
of the offender for the benefit of answering the question of diminished 
responsibility. The examination is thus intended in the first place to look at 
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the presence or absence of an inadequate development and/or a pathological 
disorder of the mind. These terms both appear in various places in Dutch law 
books and have an evident meaning for both the lawyer and the behavioural 
expert. Specific psychiatric diagnoses are not stated in the Dutch law itself. 
Inadequate development means that certain mental functions, such as the 
conscience and the emotional inner life, or intellectual powers have not 
grown to their full capacity. The term pathological disorder points to the 
presence of psychiatric symptoms, symptoms of mental illness. Psychiatric 
and psychological examination supplement each other in the sense that the 
psychiatrist makes the diagnosis according to the medical model with ‘poor 
health’ and ‘good health’ as points of reference, and the psychologist works 
from the point of deviation and deviating behaviour relative to a certain 
norm of healthy behaviour.  
For the benefit of the Dutch court, another question is often added to 
those listed above, one derived from the McNaughten-rule (1843) and used 
in many countries. This rule asserts that the suspect is mentally healthy 
unless proven otherwise. Two mental abilities need to be intact in the first 
place: awareness of the nature and the results of the criminal behaviour, and 
insight into its illegal nature. The element of free will can also be added to 
both these cognitive elements of human behaviour, so that no judicial choice 
needs to be made between determinism and indeterminism of the human 
spirit. The key question is: Is the person concerned less able to determine his 
own free will than the average person? 
 
 
6 Diminished responsibility 
 
Central to the judicial psychiatric assessment and report, which can be both 
ambulant and clinical in implementation, is the degree of responsibility of 
the person being examined. The degree to which there is a relationship 
between the disorder and the crime (or crime charged) is decisive in that the 
person involved can bear less responsibility for his crime if the influence of 
the disorder is greater. It is the medical model that determines when 
someone has a broken leg and cannot walk even if one wishes to, and that 
thus determines when one is not responsible for one’s illness. Nevertheless, 
this model is difficult to standardise, so evaluations are likely to differ in 
practice. If a judge has the idea that he or she is not able to hold the 
defendant fully responsible, he or she will ask the forensic behavioural 
expert for advice concerning the extent to which the suspect is amenable to 
their (the judge’s) assessment. 
What is important here is the degree in which the illness has driven 
someone to a certain delinquent behaviour. Judicially, illnesses and 
deficiencies are recognised as limitations to a person’s free will, so that the 
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perpetrator is accounted less responsibility for (criminal) acts that were 
carried out (partly) as a result of illness. The juridical criterion for the 
psychic disorder is “having an impaired development and/or pathological 
disturbances of the psychic capacities”. By relating this criterion to the 
offender-patient, a unique depiction is created of the combination of the 
crime and its perpetrator. In this way it is possible to put offence, offender 
and the connecting psychic disorder within the legal grounds for a certain 
degree of responsibility. 
Of course, this broad definition of psychic illness does not mean that 
these experts have carte blanche to diagnose as they see fit and instinctively 
allot someone a particular limitation (as in, “anyone who does such a thing 
must be mad”). Only when the diagnosis has been determined – assuming 
that it can be determined, because it is also possible that no disorder is found 
– will attention shift to the question if there is a relationship with the crime. 
The forensic method for this is, by assuming a certain intention and opinion 
on the part of the person and by way of presupposition, to link the found 
forensic psychiatric and psychological phenomena to these intentions and 
opinions. After that, it is the specific situation leading up to the crime that 
emphasises these characteristics of the perpetrator or even causes a drastic 
deterioration in his illness. The relationship between disorder and crime can 
be recognised in the motives of the perpetrator, the circumstances of the 
crime and its nature. 
In the Netherlands, five grades of accountability are used, even 
though Dutch criminal law does not distinguish degrees of diminished 
responsibility. Of course, such a division into five levels does not do real 
justice to the complexity of the relationship between the crime and the 
disorder that is behaviourally possible. After all, the behavioural personality 
model works via continuity, and not via categories. But the fact that these 
five categories (and not, say, eight or ten) are used has to do with the fact 
that they provide judges with a practical division for the benefit of 
accountability. A distinction is made between undiminished responsibility, 
slightly diminished responsibility, diminished responsibility, severely 
diminished responsibility and irresponsibility. 
Undiminished responsibility means that the person had complete 
access to his free will at the time of the crime with which he is charged and 
could therefore have chosen not to commit it. Irresponsibility means that the 
person concerned had no free will at all to make a conscious choice to satisfy 
his motives (disturbed as they may be) and needs. Irresponsibility means that 
the person cannot be held accountable for his acts, which means that 
punishment in itself is excluded and compulsory placement in a psychiatric 
hospital for the maximum period of one year will be indicated. The 
difference between diminished and severely diminished responsibility is that 
in the first, the role played by free will was greater and a correspondingly 
greater amount of punishment can be imposed. What is important here is the 
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determination of the moment when aspects of the disorder became manifest 
in the situation (“the scene of the crime”) that eventually led to the 
perpetration.  
A behavioural, three-way division takes place in order to justify the 
polymorphousness of psychopathology and its influence on behaviour, 
where slightly diminished and severely diminished responsibility can be 
found on either side of diminished responsibility. Severely diminished 
responsibility entails a further reduction of free will as a result of a severe 
psychiatric illness or a situation-determined exacerbation in the mental 
clinical image. Certain stimuli from the scene of the crime will then have a 
specific effect on the state of mind of the perpetrator, often resulting in a 
reality-testing disorder that spontaneously dies off after some time 
(psychotic episode) or that provokes a psychosis. Separate from the severity 
of the psychiatric picture and/or the impaired development is the degree in 
which the offence could have been avoided by the patient, which is another 
factor involved in determining the limits of irresponsibility and diminished 
responsibility. 
Slightly diminished responsibility means that there are a number of 
prominent characteristics that make the perpetrator more susceptible to 
committing crime, such as impulsiveness and anxiety. However, free will is 
only slightly limited in this case because the motives for the crime are the 
usual ones that can also be expected in the average person. In cases of 
slightly diminished responsibility, the person still has a degree of freedom of 
choice such that a considerable reduction in the chance of recidivism is not 
to be expected following treatment of the inadequate development or 
pathological disorder. Nevertheless, treatment, in combination with a 
(prison) sentence, can help reduce recidivism when given in the form of a 
special condition in the conditional part of the prison sentence, as long as the 
person concerned is motivated. The specific vulnerability factors in the 
personality can be treated, to keep delinquent impulses under better control 
and avoid situations conducive to crime. 
 
7 Risk assessment 
 
Regarding custodial clinics, it has been apparent from the outset that risk 
assessment has to be carried out not only on the basis of static (non-variable) 
factors, but especially on the basis of dynamic (variable) ones. These factors 
must relate to the individual and his treatment as well as to his future and 
past. The emphasis here is on the evaluation of the treatment provided under 
a hospital order in the hope that it has improved the behaviour of the 
offender to such an extent that the inclination to re-offend has diminished. 
Static factors that determine a risk of recidivism in the future are inadequate 
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on their own because they fail to meet the objective of predicting this risk 
after treatment under a hospital order. They cannot be altered, such as the 
age at which the first crime was committed. On the other hand, they should 
not be ignored, because static factors have a powerful predicative value. 
Risk assessment has a number of characteristics:8 
1. Checklists with scales against which the answers are plotted; 
2. These scales have been compared and tested on certain research 
groups, from which their standard is derived; in other words, they 
can be compared with one another; 
3. The method is objective: the questions are always similar and asked 
in the same manner; the answers are evaluated on the basis of 
standard scores for the various groups that have been examined; 
4. The information has been acquired in a structured manner and 
verified for completeness. 
5. The information is clear as far as answers are concerned. 
This method, however, also has its drawbacks. Specialists are needed, for 
example, who are specially trained to work out the tests and to translate the 
scores from the checklists into assessments about the individual. The 
validation of the checklists in the case of specific groups determines the way 
they are completed by other groups, who may occasionally interpret certain 
questions in a completely different manner or for whom the checklist is less 
applicable (I have in mind the difference between first offenders, offenders 
under a hospital order and persistently dangerous, long-term offenders under 
a hospital order). This validation also includes cut-off points; in other words, 
the degree of risk, deviation or illness accepted is arbitrary. These cut-off 
points are based on agreements made among experts themselves or between 
them and policymakers. A checklist should also contain enough dynamic 
factors if it is to be suitable for assessing the progress of treatment, otherwise 
an individual’s prognosis will remain permanently dependant on his 
unchangeable past. The conclusions based on risk assessment therefore 
indicate the probability of future risks. 
But clinical assessment of the ‘risk of recidivism’ posed by 
offenders under a hospital order is also based on probability. Clinical data, as 
well as behaviour in the ward and case history, are used to assign a certain 
degree of risk to a particular individual. On the one hand, this assessment 
appears to be more specific; additional personal information is taken into 
consideration, as situational factors and the nature of the crime can be 
immediately deduced from the case history of the individual. On the other 
hand, the expertise of the assessors can only be evaluated to a certain extent, 
                                                 
8 H.J.C. van Marle, ‘Van gevaar naar risico: regelen in plaats van waarschuwen. 
Risk-assessment in de forensische psychiatrie’ (2001) 43 Tijdschrift voor 
Psychiatrie 151 at 161. 
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as the number of years’ experience is not representative and the standards 
they use to make their assessments cannot be made more explicit, as they are 
often based on a subjective form of expertise and training. 
Another drawback is that a clinical assessment is usually made in an 
implicit and intuitive manner and does not involve any objectification 
standards. Often the risks that are taken into consideration during clinical 
assessments and the nature of their severity are uncertain. In any case, the 
clinical decisions can be used for an individual patient in a particular 
circumstance, in granting various forms of leave and privileges, for example. 
Risk assessment always involves a (quantifiable) probability margin, that of 
‘false positive’ and ‘false negative’ predictions, of a specific instrument 
within a specific population over a specific period. That is why, in an 
individual case and on the basis of that probability, another, separate 
decision is required for the application of a specific intervention, which is, 
after all, bound by time and situation. The advantage of this ‘clinical’ 
decision, incidentally, is that it is standardised, since arguments and risk 
factors can be described in full. 
Over the past few years, risk-assessment instruments have acquired 
considerable influence in the discussion on evaluating the risk of recidivism. 
Some custodial clinics already implicitly use assessment data in the 
recommendations they make to courts concerning extensions of hospital 
orders. Courts are therefore saddled with various evaluation models (under 
the same Penal Code) for convicted individuals. This affects the principles of 
equality before the law and legal certainty enjoyed by every offender under a 
hospital order. How should the information in the recommendation to extend 
a hospital order be interpreted and to what extent is it objective? By the way, 
it is amazing that till now risk assessment in the Netherlands has been 
limited to criminal law – in this case the evaluation of offenders under a 
hospital order. In my opinion, risk assessment is equally applicable to all 
those psychiatric patients who have been placed involuntarily in general 
psychiatric hospitals by means of a court order.  
  
8 Debate 
 
The rules of the interface are that everyone is committed and thus knows 
both goals of the interpretation, but from their own professional point of 
view. Judges do not have to measure but they should know what certain 
measurements mean with regard to their case. Psychiatrists are not law 
experts but they should know that their answers to juridical questions have to 
fit into the juridical system. So they have to know the meaning and 
limitations of a sentence before they can give a practical advice, making 
permanent education among confrères necessary. Now that forensic 
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psychology, with its research emphasis on courtroom sessions, is making its 
way to the court, much criticism from that side has been voiced on the 
interface of law and forensic psychiatry. The main difficulty encountered by 
forensic psychology is that the concepts used in that interface cannot be 
measured, are not objective from an empirical point of view and are ill-
defined. From my point of view this is not necessary, as the questions are 
answered within the juridical domain and are not suited for empirical 
research. The following will clarify this point of view. 
From the behavioural sciences there is often criticism about the fact 
that forensic psychiatrists and psychologists use the phrases ‘free will’ and 
‘responsibility for the offence’ freely, while there are no empirical 
measurements whatsoever for these concepts. My opinion is that these critics 
look only from the side of their own domain of knowledge to the interface of 
law and psychiatry, and do not speak the common language. The forensic 
examination is necessary to find answers to juridical questions and thus the 
ruling domain is the juridical. In this domain free will is a juridical and 
philosophical idea, not a ‘thing’ that can be measured in laboratory 
situations. The axiom of law is that it is there for everyone and exceptions 
should be few (for instance when a person’s capacities to make decisions or 
control emotions are diminished by a psychiatric illness). For the law we are 
all the same and we all live under the same idea of free will. How free and 
how determined men are does not matter in this case; the reasoning starts 
with identifying the exceptions mentioned by the law itself, all others are 
equal in their decision making.  
The same holds true with regard to the three degrees of diminished 
responsibility. These are very practical for judges, as they refer to different 
sanctions within the realm of criminal law. We have the prison sentence, 
detainment under a hospital order and a combination of the two. But in the 
psychiatric domain there are no measurements which can show the 
differences between these degrees in the examination of one person. 
Psychiatrists can draw conclusions about full responsibility (no mental 
disorders), total irresponsibility (a mental disorder has taken over the control 
of the mind of the patient, as in psychosis), and the intermediate area of 
diminished responsibility, where mental disorder and situational influences 
interact in an escalating process. Variations in the diminished responsibility, 
like slightly or severely diminished, are not measurable by psychiatric or 
psychological means. It is extracted from the findings of the forensic 
examination but weighed intuitively against other cases. At that moment the 
psychiatrist sits in the judge’s chair, as he cannot motivate his conclusion on 
the basis of his own medical paradigm. It is an impressionistic conclusion, 
which has nothing to do with a medical attitude towards the patient and 
should be abstained from. The frontier of the interface has been reached. 
The same problem is encountered in the reconstruction of the 
situation of the perpetrator and his offence. The psychiatrist works in the 
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past and tries to distil psychiatric ‘facts’ from the past and the present from 
the words of his examinee. How can they ever become real facts and what 
are they good for in court cases, in how far are they reliable? Here, too, the 
answer comes from the interface: a court examination is in the juridical 
domain. Facts gleaned from witnesses, perpetrators and experts are as good 
as they are; these facts are examined by experienced forensic experts and 
commented on by them as an advice to the court. And then the juridical 
ruling takes place in its own domain with its own criteria of justice, fairness 
and proportionality. Please note that it is an advice, so it brings with it the 
possibility of being rejected. Its contents should be clear and of sound 
judgement, the empirical facts well-clarified and shown in relation to other 
possible interpretations. If a suspect refuses to talk or denies the offence, no 
examination can take place, no answer found. As with any other patient in 
general practice, an examination is not possible if he does not co-operate, 
only circumstantial data can be known from other information. This is not 
enough information to turn up juridical answers about this person. Facts 
about the offence will not be found, as the forensic examination cannot be 
executed, but only the present state diagnosed. Psychiatric interpretations of 
the present to the past of the offence are not possible, as this past does not 
exist in the examining situation. Because in the interface the forensic 
psychiatric examination is ‘patient-context-past’-oriented, in these cases the 
examination itself is invalid and cannot be used in court. 
 With regard to the enforcement of detention under a hospital order, 
risk-assessment instruments are particularly important in evaluating the 
treatment process, as they record differences over the course of time. We 
cannot afford to ignore these instruments, since failure to use them has been 
shown to affect our evaluation of danger and is therefore unethical with 
respect to the patient and the general public.9 Those factors that can be 
altered during a treatment situation or during follow-up care are especially 
relevant for assessment in everyday situations. Historical factors cannot, 
after all, be changed. As a result, they cannot serve as a guiding principle for 
intervention, even though they are powerful predictors of future risks. That is 
why they must somehow be included in the everyday depiction, as their 
presence always entails an increased risk. A model in which static and 
dynamic factors are compared and correlated is therefore required for the 
clinical decision process. 
Selecting treatment evaluation with the help of dynamic factors 
explicitly involves the choice of certain types of risk-assessment checklists, 
                                                 
9 W.M. Grove and P.E. Meehl, ‘Comparative efficiency of informal (subjective, 
impressionistic) and formal (mechanical, algorithmic) prediction procedures: The 
clinical-statistical controversy’ (1996) 2 Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 293 at 
323. 
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namely those allowing enough variable factors to be checked which reflect 
the results of the treatment provided under a hospital order. The assessments 
made at various times during the treatment already provide information 
about the responsiveness of the relevant individual to the treatment. These 
measurement points, however, cannot replace daily decisions relating to the 
patient’s behaviour, such as clinical supervision and placement in an 
isolation cell. Furthermore, the patient’s cooperation is required for the 
completion of the checklists, which must be based on trends in the treatment 
and not on incidental moments. The knowledge and skills of staff with 
clinical experience is essential for daily departmental management.  
 
 
9 Concluding remarks 
 
In the interface between law and forensic psychiatry the influence of modern 
examination techniques and risk assessment is growing increasingly. These 
techniques, however, are not forensic in the way that they can connect their 
empirical facts to the individual patient as the suspect who will be tried in a 
court of law. Their conclusions still need to be interpreted in the light of the 
juridical situation and the individual case history. The forensic behavioural 
experts are the interpreters. Their interpretation has its limits, as the 
emotional ‘facts’ should be reproducible in peer-review and the methods of 
examining and interpreting should be accepted by the relevant scientific 
field. The empirical sciences give more objectivity in their findings, but their 
influence still can be only auxiliary to the juridical reality and the daily 
practice of forensic treatment.
 
